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ABSTRACT
Countries in sub-saharan Africa, like their counterparts elsewhere in the world, have been 
going through social, economic, legal and political changes. The changes range from 
colonialism to independence, from one party and military dictatorships to the current multi­
party democracy. Through all these changes, the legal system in general and the judiciary 
in particular, which were imposed by colonial powers, have been influenced by the demands 
of each phase as much as they have attempted to influence or cope with these changes. 
Notions of liberalism and individualism, inherited at independence from both the English 
and Roman-Dutch common law, for example, had to measure up to or to be m easured 
against the requirements of one-party ideologies administered by state bureaucrats in 
circum stances where ruling parties were regarded as suprem e. These changes and 
corresponding demands of the time did not pass without consequences and /  or implications 
on the legal system and the judiciary. Political centralism appears to be on the way out and 
multi-party democracy is on the way in.
During centralised governance, several things went wrong and the World Bank has recently 
identified the judiciary among institutions which have been run down. The Bank expressed 
the need for and willingness to take part in rebuilding these institutions so that they could 
effectively regulate competing political and economic interests, preserve the rule of law 
and protect hum an rights in the newly introduced political pluralism and free market 
systems.
This article examines how the judiciary was marginalised during centralised governance 
and analyses the complexities they will have to grapple w ith in the new era. Conclusions 
are draw n that the judiciary in the sub-region will have to do a lot more not only to w in the 
hearts and minds of most of the people in their respective countries bu t also to satisfy 
social expectations and rebuild the otherwise tarnished legitimacy. In order for the proposed 
reconstruction to be meaningful, public indignation with law and legal institutions need 
to be recognised and addressed. Such com prehension calls for constructive public 
participation in all forms of legal reform as part of democratisation.
* Thoughts expressed in this paper developed as part of a larger study undertaken by the author at the 
Chr. Michelsen Institute-CMl (Bergen, Norway) in 1995 where he was Research Fellow. The author is 
grateful to the CMI for all the assistance and facilities provided towards the perfection of this task. A 
number of people at CMI and in Tanzania have been very helpful in the course of this research. To all 
of them I express my sincere gratitude. Special thanks to Professor Sesay, Dr. Bart Rwezaura and 
Michael Wambali for reading and commenting on the drafts. I also thank Professor J. Ngwisha and 
Dr. A. Kanduza for updating me on the developments in Zambia.
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INTRODUCTION
The observance of the rule of law and respect for individual hum an rights are said to be 
among the important components of good governance. The judiciary is known to be the 
custodian of most, if not all, the ideals that go with the rule of law and hum an rights. Law 
and the judiciary, therefore are expected to be essential pillars in the emerging era of political 
pluralism in sub-saharan Africa as the two are central in the regulatory process for purposes 
of fair play. Much as these observations are made by the proponents of political pluralism 
and good governance, they are echoed by the players in the game of power and power- 
seeking and heard by all of us (small-time players and spectators most of the time). With 
the exception of South Africa, very little has been said about the complexities of the law 
and  the uncertain ties surrounding  justice adm inistration in general and  sensitive 
constitutional interpretation and protection of human rights in particular in other countries 
in the sub-region. Very rarely have the parties involved in  the promotion of political 
pluralism and good governance made sober and concerted efforts to examine the practices, 
strengths and weaknesses inherent in the law, the legal systems and institutions expected 
to be responsible for providing the necessary regulation during the era now in the making. 
In Tanzania, for example, one political commentator recently suggested in a newspaper 
article that the judiciary was favouring the opposition.1 The cartoon that accompanied the 
story showed a person wearing a CCM (ruling party) shirt playing volleyball against 
another, in an opposition shirt, with the judiciary on the opposition side. These observations, 
which have been made several times even before the publication of this newspaper article, 
are partly based on a faulty understanding of legal technicalities and may oversimplify the 
complexities inherent in judicial decision making.
The judiciary is known to very conservative and there is little to suggest that it is likely to 
make any adjustment and act otherwise in the new era. This rather sceptical and pessimistic 
observation derives not from any disrespect for the rule of law and independence of the 
judiciary or a distrust of personalities entrusted with the regulation process. Far from it. It 
is based on abundant evidence available from places that are geographically, economically 
and culturally divergent. The places from which evidence for this conclusion is based 
include: England, India, Kenya, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, 
to mention only a few.2 Literature from these countries shows that the judiciary can be and 
has been compliant, subservient, and executive-minded, to the detriment and at the expense 
of individual rights. These are genuine concerns which need to be recognised and addressed 
during the transition period. Discussions on this important aspect of political pluralism 
and democratisation seem to be lacking. Law and legal institutions are taken for granted 
to an extent that opportunities for reflecting on and reviewing of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the system, the institutions, and the persons who are the main actors in the 
institutions are wasted.
1. See The East Africa, 17th April 1995.
2. Literature from the countries in question include: England (Griffiths 1977), India (Baxi, 1982, Iyer 
1987), Kenya (Days III: 1992, Kuria 1991), South Africa (Dugard 1978, Ellmann 1992), Swaziland 
(Hlatshwayo 1992), Tanzania (Mwaikusa 1991, Mwalusanya 1995 a & b, Shivji 1985), Zambia (Mbao 
1989 & Mubako 1983/84) and Zimbabwe (Gutto & Makamure 1985, Christie 1983). In these countries 
the role of the judiciary and especially its limitations in the protection of human rights has been 
widely discussed. In the course of such discussions judges were not only made aware of public 
expectations regarding their important role; they were also reminded of the consequences of their 
abdication of judicial duty.
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The elevation of law and legal machinery from marginality, suffered during one party rule 
and military dictatorships, to centrality during the democratisation process, w ithout 
adequate discussion might not only obscure the history of liberal legalism in general, and 
its application in the sub-region, but might also prevent us from learning im portant lessons 
elsewhere. This article does not provide any concrete answers to the questions it raises but 
marks signposts towards the search for answers. An opportunity to reflect on the questions 
may help us to come to term s with what we have already observed (in the form of 
constitutional enactments and cases decided by judges in superior courts) and deliberate 
on potential courses of action and decisions. By so doing we may be able to avoid arriving 
at rushed and potentially erroneous conclusions.
LIBERAL LEGALISM AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE JUDICIARY
The existing legal systems in most countries in the sub-region are basically English and 
Roman-Dutch in origin. One can safely conclude that the judiciary imposed on these 
countries by colonial m asters survived as an institution through the colonial era to 
independence, through the socialist construction and military rules, and now into the multi­
party system of government. Although personalities have to a large extent changed, due 
to wear and tear and other reasons, the institution and most of the rules and practices 
applicable have remained largely the same. This partly reflects the resilience of the institution 
in question but, on the other hand, it is also evidence of how some institutions are very 
difficult to change. The judiciary being professional in character, the m anner and patterns 
of its application of legal rules are m atters acquired through long tern training and 
assimilation and, therefore, internalised and not easy to shake off.
It is common knowledge that crises involving the state in most countries in Africa, also 
affected the legal system. The executive monopoly and domination which did not end 
with the economic sphere but extended to the political process, including the law making 
body (the legislature) also affected the judiciary somewhat. It has also been noted in the 
literature that the judiciary, being aware of the trends in the exercise of executive powers, 
adopted a subservient posture and that some of its members even became executive-minded. 
With the advent of multi-partyism in Tanzania, for example, the Honourable Chief Francis 
Nyalali observed that legalism was marginalised in favour of policy during the one-party 
rule.3
Partly due to these crises the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World 
Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (otherwise known as the terrible twins) in 
collaboration w ith  o ther w estern  donors, in tervened  and  dem anded not only the 
liberalisation of economies but also a change in the governance approach, both of which 
have implications to the application of law and legal institutions (World Bank 1989).
Questions which arise out of these economic, social and political developments include: 
how much has judicial credibility and legitimacy been affected by the crises? W hat has the 
judiciary done to remedy the injury and how? What are the feelings of the powers-that-be 
and the general public towards the crises and remedial measures? These are not easy
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questions and answers may differ along political and ideological lines. Some things are 
certain however. Members of the judiciary, at least those in decision making positions, 
acknowledge that some of the m ud thrown at them did stick. The extent of the washing 
and the cleanliness of the linen are matters which will be decided with time. Although 
there may be differences as to the causes of the crises and the remedies thereto, free market 
and political pluralism have already been chosen as part of the way out of the crises. The 
centrality of law with the independent judiciary as custodians of the rule of law, individual 
human rights and regulators of competing interests are part of this system now being put 
in place. It is because of this elevation of law and legal institutions, especially the judiciary 
in this case, that a proper understanding of the legal processes in general and the judiciary 
in particular is called for.
TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING
It has been suggested that in free market and political pluralism, law and legal institutions 
are accorded a central and prominent role. This is in sharp contrast to the centralised state 
and one-party regimes where law and legal institutions are marginalised and played down. 
In order to understand the legal system and legal institutions, certain important historical 
facts have to be borne in mind.
For the sake of clarity, therefore, it m ust be stressed that the judiciary, as an institution, in 
Tanzania for example, has gone through three important phases. It was created during the 
colonial era, inherited at independence and has survived through the Arusha Declaration 
and one party rule. With political pluralism, the judiciary is entering into a fourth phase. 
Each of these had its own importance in the history of that country and, therefore, each 
phase had and was likely to have its own demands on the judiciary. The judiciary in other 
countries can be categorised almost in the same way. For want of time and space the 
treatment of that history will have to wait for another occasion. For the purpose of this 
paper, it suffices to say that the judiciary in Tanzania, and elsewhere in sub-saharan Africa, 
has remained an important institution for the settlement of disputes, notwithstanding the 
constraints within which it is operated. Although this is no meagre achievement, it should 
also not be a reason for complacency especially in the light of new demands.
Challenges and demands placed on the judiciary during the one-party and military rule 
were wide ranging. As has already been noted, law was used to promote a single ideology 
and maintain the power of an unchallenged ruling class and the judiciary endorsed most 
of these aspirations (see Kuria 1991:28). All these difficulties notwithstanding, the judiciary 
survived. It performed important functions and even managed to stir out of trouble. How 
the judiciary managed to avoid trouble yet still perform such an im portant role is an 
indication of what it is capable of doing. How the judiciary performs in times of trouble 
depend on the approaches its members adopt in the interpretation of the Constitution and 
other laws made by Parliament. These approaches need to be considered.
Approaches to Judicial Decision Making
In the performance of their duties judges often find themselves not only dealing with both 
easy and difficult cases but also having to decide cases in normal and abnormal situations. 
In whatever condition they find themselves they are expected to apply the law made by
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Parliament or decrees issued by the powers-that-be, to the facts before them and pronounce 
judgement on the matter. There are several methods by which they do that. For the purposes 
of this discussion examples of two dominant styles of judicial opinion may help to illustrate 
how judges approach sensitive political issues in both the Anglo-American and Roman- 
Dutch legal tradition. From these illustrations a conclusion may be draw n regarding the 
category to which judges in the superior courts in sub-saharan Africa may be placed.
Masons in the Judiciary: The Exercise of Restraint
Under this category it is argued that judges do not make law but they administer the law. 
It is said that they do that by interpreting the law literally by seeking to ascertain its purport 
through the sole medium of words. The argument goes on that by so doing judges are 
acting in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers, which among other things, 
requires that each branch of government should perform only the functions entrusted to it. 
In this case of the judiciary, the function is to interpret the law and never to make it. By 
restricting them selves to the interpretation of law they do not only m aintain their 
independence but also their impartiality. Judges in this category are also called formalists, 
timorous souls, traditionalists etc.
A warning given against dangers inherent in judicial creativity is that judicial law-making 
is unacceptable because it is undemocratic and that if allowed would create rights where 
there were none. Mauro Cappelletti, who has researched and published extensively on the 
law-making powers of judges, has observed that:
in all its expressions, formalism tended to accentuate the element of pure and 
mechanical logic in judicial decision making, while neglecting, or hiding, the 
voluntaristic, discretionary element of choice. . .  choice means discretion even though 
not necessarily arbitrariness; it means evaluation and balancing: it means giving 
consideration to the choice's practical and moral results; and it means employments 
of not only the arguments of abstract logic, but those of economics and politics, ethics, 
sociology, and psychology (Cappelletti 1981:21).
His conclusion is that the role of judges is not to interpret the law literally. They go beyond 
the literal m eaning of words.
Judicial Architects: The Purposive Approach
The opposite of judicial restraint is judicial creativity. Some theorists have suggested that 
judicial creativity was a revolt against judicial restraint. They emphasize that it was false 
and illusory to suggest that pure deductive logic could help the judge ascertain the law 
uncreatively and without personal responsibility. It is argued that in the field of judicial 
interpretation there is a middle ground where choice and discretion may be exercised and 
a purposive approach brought into play. The words of Lord Reid capture the distinctions 
as follows:
Those with the taste for fairy tales seem to have thought that in some Aladdin's Cave 
there is hidden the common law in all its splendour and that on a judge's appointment 4
4. The distinction between mason and architects is adopted from the categorisation of pericles and 
plumbers of Twining (1967). See also Bridge (1975).
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there descend on him knowledge of the magic words "Open Sesame!''. Bad decisions 
are given when the judge muddles the password and the wrong doors open. We do 
not believe in fairy tales any more (Quoted in Lord Lester 1993: 269).
In its history this revolt has not been smooth. However, through it, legal rights were extended 
to blacks and women in America which no one disputes today. In England judges read into 
the common law, without the intervention of parliament (though endorsed later), the rights 
of the wife to hold the title to property jointly with her husband when the title was doubtful. 
Many examples of rights may be listed which were created and recognised through judicial 
activism.
As expressed by Lord Reid in the quotation above, English judges have for a long time 
fallen in either of the two broad categories. Those who exercise judicial restraint and limit 
themselves to finding the meaning of words as laid down by Parliament and those who 
are willing to go beyond the meaning of words and explore the purpose for which 
legislations were passed. Those in the former category do not in most cases upset the 
executive. But judges in the latter category do cause some disquiet among executive ranks 
(see Woodhouse 1995 and 1996).
During the apartheid era in South Africa and especially in the mid-1960s, judicial restraint 
was the most favoured approach (see Dugard 1978: especially Chapter 9). There is abundant 
evidence to show that most judges in sub-saharan Africa, like most of their colleagues in 
Britain and apartheid South Africa, adopted the former approach in favour of the latter. 
They shielded themselves behind formalism and ignored creativity. Accordingly, most 
decisions justified executive action in the place of the rights of individuals who appeared 
before the courts. The laws were interpreted literally irrespective of the social, cultural and 
political harm they caused. By so doing, the judges stirred themselves out of trouble but, 
in turn, underm ined their role as custodians of justice, the rule of law and hum an rights.
The conflict between these two approaches brings with it several difficulties indicative of 
the dilemma faced by the judiciary in the course of their exercise of their functions in 
general and during the transition towards the multi-party era. An understanding of this 
dilemma m ay take up some way towards an appreciation of the inherent difficulties 
surrounding judicial decision making processes. Judicial neutrality and independence, 
which are among the cornerstones of judicial processes, do not mean the same thing to 
different interest groups especially in the light of the changing nature of governance in  the 
light of newly found freedoms enacted in justiciable Bills of Rights. Examples from Namibia, 
Tanzania and Zambia illustrate this.
The Judiciary in Sub-Saharan Africa: From Marginality to Prominence
The role of the law and the functioning of the legal system, and especially the judiciary in 
the sub-region, during political pluralism, has to be understood within the historical and 
comparative perspectives discussed above. This is more so because not only has the failure 
of centralised governance, and its attendant consequences to social institutions, been 
extensively demonstrated (see Wunsch & Olowu 1990), but also because it is due to that 
failure that democratic governance in general, and constitutionalism and hum an rights in 
particular, have been promoted as part of the cure (World Bank).
EX
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The transition from centralism to multi-partyism is associated with changing emphasis in 
the way in which political power is exercised. Unlike times gone by, judiciaries in countries 
in the sub-region will be expected to play an important role in the control of the law­
making powers of parliaments as well as executive powers where these are suspected of 
offending the respective constitutions. In other words, constitutional supremacy. As would 
be expected, these momentous changes are not without difficulties.
A judge appointed to the High Court in Namibia was assumed to be a staunch opponent of 
apartheid (Steyler 1993: 493). His appointment was considered objectionable in some 
quarters and there were calls for his dismissal on grounds of his alleged allegiance to the 
ruling party — SWAPO. It was not long after appointment that he presided over a matter 
and handed down a decision which stunned his alleged allies. They not only turned against 
him by demonstrating on the streets; they also called him names ranging from " Apartheid 
judge", "Colonial judge", to "Racist judge." They also called for his dismissal. The following 
is what- the judge had to say:
Two years ago some people called for my dismissal on the ground of alleged sympathy 
with SWAPO. Now a SWAPO-leader and SWAPO-supporters ask for my dismissal, 
inter alia, on the ground of an alleged colonialist and anti-black mentality. According 
to them I have become irrelevant to black thinking in Namibia as I should not be on 
the High Court Bench at all.5
The judge acknowledged the quandary in which he found himself. He quoted the provisions 
of the Constitution at length and called on those in power not only to observe and protect 
the Constitution, under which his office is created, but also pleaded with them  to exercise 
their power and take action against whoever was involved in inciting the public to get on 
to the streets.
The material on the developments in Zambia is scanty but nevertheless informative. A 
High Court judge was reported to have resigned recently.6 Two reasons were given. One of 
these reasons was that the judge had not been promoted above the position of the High 
Court judge which he had held for more that eight years. Colleagues who came to the 
Bench after him had been promoted to the Supreme Court. The resignation, though, came 
after the said judge had been suspended from duty for several months and a Constitutional 
Tribunal of Inquiry appointed by the President to determine whether his services should 
be terminated or otherwise. In regard to the pending inquiry the second reason for the 
resignation was given. The judge observed that he had decided to leave because he was 
not sure whether the tribunal appointed to probe him would be fair. The judge remarked 
that he had information that a judge had been sent abroad to appraise a member of the 
tribunal before it sat. He is quoted to have said that:
5. Page 786 of Judge O'Linn's judgement in the case of S v Heita and Anothei■ 1992 (3) South African Law 
Report, 785-796.
6. This was not the first resignation of a judge in Zambia nor is it likely to be the last there and elsewhere 
in sub-Saharan Africa. In 1969 Justice James Skinner, the Chief Justice of Zambia, resigned after 
enormous pressure was exerted on him and other judges by President Kaunda and ruling party 
officials (see Hall 1969: Chapter 14), Chief Justice Annel Silungwe, also a Zambian, resigned in June 
1992 following his alleged involvement in a high profile case and public outrage about a Supreme 
Court decision (see Mbao 1992). Dugard (1978: 22) reports that President Kruger dismissed Justice 
Kotze in 1897 after a decision in which the judges asserted the court had power of judicial review.
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To me, this is clear evidence that our Supreme Court, as currently constituted, has 
desecrated and thrown to the winds the sacrosanct principle of impartiality in a trial 
(Times of Zambia, 15th August 1997).
Press reports suggest that the judge in question had fallen out of favour with the authorities 
because of his tough stance against supposed governm ent heavy-handedness. Two 
examples were cited. First, the judge had at some stage issued a ruling to the effect that the 
Speaker of Parliament had no power to send newspaper editors to prison. Secondly, the 
said judge is reported to have released suspects who had spent several years in prison 
w ithout trial. The judge did not comment on the first of the two. As to the second one he 
maintained that there was nothing wrong in him releasing suspects who had been detained 
for more than four years without being tried. He added that he was not the only judge who 
had done that.
In Tanzania, on the other hand, a judge of the High Court has expressed his frustration 
with his brethren who, he said, have been party to the abuse of power and violation of 
hum an rights in the country. He has gone to great length to show how this had come 
about. Expressing his frustration the judge made remarks like: "lawyers in ideological 
fog", "burying their heads in the sand", "the legitimacy of the judiciary is underm ined" 
"community confidence in the judiciary has declined". Unlike the Namibian judge, who 
complained that he was called names by the demonstrating public, the Tanzanian judge 
pinned labels on his colleagues.
After identifying the above weaknesses among his colleagues the judge in question has 
declared categorically that he supports democracy in general and m ulti-partyism  in 
particular. He has noted that human rights have to be respected by those in power and 
have to be protected by those who occupy judicial offices. The judiciary, the judge said, 
"must make itself relevant to society."
The ambiguities in the above case studies are very glaring. A point relevant to this discussion 
is that contenders were pulling in different directions. In each of them the contesting parties 
(the demonstrating public in Namibia, the power-that-be in the case of Zambia and the 
judges) may claim to have exercised some aspects of democracy. The judges in question 
may insist that they were doing their work in accordance with their oaths of office — 
without fear or favour — and as one would expect, with the help of God. The events and 
processes leading to the issues discussed above, however, did not please everyone. The 
Namibian judge appeared to be puzzled by the demonstration. How could a section of the 
population be allowed to undermine the integrity of the judge and the judiciary in general, 
threaten the ethos of the rule of law enshrined in the Constitution and underm ine 
constitutional democracy? His Tanzania counterpart, on the other hand, considered it 
prudent to declare what he thought was not right within the judiciary and had the courage 
of appealing to colleagues to correct their attitudes and adopt what he regarded as the 
proper approach.
The Namibian judge was in no doubt about the source of his powers — the Constitution, 
from which he quoted at length. He even quoted the oath of office for Namibian judges in 
order to show his accuser that he has never fallen short of what was expected of him in his 
performance of judicial functions. Whereas leaders of the legal fraternity in Namibia issued 
strong statements in support of their brethren, it is apparent from the statement of the
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Zam bian judge that the constitutional principles were being underm ined w ith the 
connivance of certain members of the legal profession or that some of these colleagues 
were abetting the disregard of established principles.
Whereas the Tanzanian judge appealed to his colleagues to harmonise constitutional 
provisions with the practical realities and the plight of the common man, the Namibia 
judge, on his part, called on his counterparts to rally behind him and condem n the 
demonstrating public and in so doing protect the Constitution. Their Zambian colleague, 
on the other hand, appeared to have no constituency to appeal to. He had lost confidence 
in his own brethren, who he suspected of partiality. He did not seem to have anything to 
tell the general public nor did he have audience. He decided to call it a day by offering his 
resignation — which the President, we were told, accepted without any regrets.
Senior lawyers rallied behind their colleague in Namibia. There has not been any such 
show of solidarity among Zambian lawyers in general and judicial officers in particular. It 
appears that Zam bian judicial officers have preferred to express their neutrality  by 
rem aining silent and shielding behind the abstract rules of the Constitution. Judicial 
reticence in that particular instance, like in other similar circumstances, may be defended 
as being in keeping with the judicial oath of office which demands of them to decide matters 
which come before them in one way or another and let parties to the cases and other 
observers and commentators decide for themselves. That does not necessarily mean, 
however, that their conscience and political leanings cannot be determined.
Public displeasure with judicial decisions can be dismissed with impunity as in the case in 
Namibia. Calls for the arrest of those instigating the public to protest against such decisions 
could be made and even implemented. This is only possible because members of the public 
have limited influence, if any, and no effective means of enforcing their disapproval. Judicial 
frustration, as in the case of Tanzania, could be expressed and implemented, as in the case 
of Zambia, with little regard for constitutional safeguards and with impunity. The roles 
played by law yers and judicial officers in the above case studies dem onstrate how 
safeguarding democracy in general, and protection of hum an rights in particular, are much 
more complex than currently provided for by the constitutional rules in general and liberal 
constitutional principles in particular.
As part of the reflection on the complexities, several questions need to be asked here: which 
one of the contending forces (the powers-that-be, as in the case of Zambia and Tanzania, 
and the powerless demonstrating public, as in the case of Namibia) poses more threat to 
democracy, constitutionalism, the rule of law and hum an rights? Is it democracy, the 
Constitution and its principles, the judges, other powers-that-be or the general public? 
How and who should provide that protection? These questions and others of the like need 
to be debated and should not be taken for granted.
Allegations of Corruption in the Judiciary?
N otwithstanding the complexities surrounding the distinction between the masons and 
architects in judicial decision making, and the attendant suspicions surrounding them, 
allegations of corruption among judicial officers have also been voiced. This is not to be 
regarded a phenomenon limited to sub-Saharan Africa. Such allegations are known to have 
been recorded in places like Britain sometime in its history (Pannick 1987: 89). Similar 
suggestions have been heard in the Indian sub-continent (Singhi 1981) and the West Indies.
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In the case of sub-saharan Africa allegations of corruption among judicial officers have 
been made in Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Swaziland to mention only a few. These 
allegations could not have come at a worst point in time, this being the time when almost 
all centres of power and influence are said to be involved in one form of corruption or 
other. Judicial officers would have done better if they were spared those negative aspects 
in order for them to be able to exercise their power of censure more effectively. There is 
only a meagre chance that the above is the case.
If we were to extend our imaginations as to the feelings of judicial officers regarding this 
state of affairs one of several replies might be expected. Without proof beyond reasonable 
doubt the above allegations remain unsubstantiated and should be regarded merely as 
such. Correct as that reply sounds, it does not, however, mean that members of the general 
public who appear before judicial officers, either as complainants and victims of hum an 
rights violations or as witnesses, take such allegations lightly. As expressed in the legal 
jargon that, "justice need not only be done, it must manifestly be seen to be done." Surely, 
in prevailing circumstances one cannot safely say that "Ceasar's wife is beyond reproach." 
In the absence of that the bases on which liberal justice rest are already in doubt. Even if 
justice was to be done it may not be said to have manifestly been seen to be done. That, in 
itself, has enormous consequences not only to the institutions of power, but also to the 
wider social fabric in which the institutions concerned operate.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
It was suggested earlier that there appears to be a tendency of taking some of the issues 
raised here for granted. If this view is shared then there is need to consider and reflect 
more rigorously not only on the transformation that is taking place in the world in general 
and  in  the  sub-reg ion  in  particu lar, b u t also on the  consequences w hich  these 
transformations have on the allocation of power in general and on judicial decision making 
in particular.
Judges deference to the executive and to some extent acquiescence to abuse of power, which 
characterised the judiciary in centralised regimes, was unacceptable and is least desirable 
and without a place in multi-party democracy. To what extent members of the judiciary 
will be able to discard past images, in the context of the constraints discussed above, we 
should not speculate on but deliberate. One feature, though, is clear. Democracy and the 
protection of hum an rights in particular, which entails among other things, participation 
and openness, has to extend not only to the ways in which judicial power is exercised; they 
m ust encompass the manner in which the consumers of legal services relate the taxes paid 
to services rendered. Democracy, of whatever form, will be incomplete without that.
What can be gathered from the three case studies above, and experiences from other sub- 
saharan African countries in general, is that all is not well with existing structures of 
governance. Constitutional provisions and prevailing practices in governance institutions 
give a raw  deal to the general populace. Besides periodic franchise the general population 
is at the mercy of power holders, be it the Executive, Legislature and even the Judiciary. 
This imbalance in power arrangements cannot be justified in whatever form of democracy. 
It is high time that the imbalance is consciously deliberated upon and measures of putting 
it right are considered. In the absence of that we will all be accused, as Justice Mwalusanya 
has done, of burying our heads in the sand like ostriches.
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